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Abstract. Users are bothered by too many security warnings in a vari-
ety of applications. To reduce the number of unnecessary warnings, de-
velopers cannot continue to report technical security problems. Instead,
they need to consider the actual risks of the context for the decision of
whether and how to warn – contextualized warnings. For this risk assess-
ment, developers need to encode expert knowledge. Given the number
and complexity of the risks – for example, in Web browsing –, eliciting
and encoding the expert knowledge is challenging. In this paper, we pro-
pose a holistic methodology for an abstract risk assessment that builds
upon prior concepts from risk management, such as decision trees. The
result of the methodology is an abstract risk model – a model to as-
sess the risk for the concrete context. In a case study, we show how this
methodology can be applied to warnings in Web browsers.
Keywords: Risk assessment, Security interventions, Web-browser warn-
ings
1 Introduction
When implementing security warnings, software developers often conveniently
o↵-load the risk assessment of the situation to the user. They just report every
technical security problem. However, the resulting prevalence of warnings leads
to habituation, and this, in turn, to users ignoring them. This is the case for
a variety of applications. One example is that of mobile applications, where
technical lists of required permissions are ignored [4, 7]. Even more often, it
has been observed how Web-browser warnings are ignored [13, 10]. To solve this
problem, the number of false positives need to be reduced: those warnings that
are shown need to count.
The required proper risk assessment prior to showing a warning comes with
a high cost: A significantly more complex warning logic than the current hard-
wired warnings that are directly tied to technical indicators. One such example
for Web browsing is to show a certificate warning in case the trust chain of the
TLS server certificate cannot be established. In previous work [1], we have pro-
posed to support the developers by lowering the threshold for risk-based decisions
of whether and how to intervene. These decisions are then “contextualized” since
they take more context into account. In particular, the risk assessment needs to
be based on more complex risk models than “technical problem ! warning.”
This risk model needs to encode whether and how experts estimate the risk level
based on the context – encoding expert knowledge.
The expert knowledge links the description of a situation with the decision of
whether and how to intervene. To give an example from Web browsing, typical
indicators describing the situation include the security of the current connection,
the type of the website, and trustworthiness ratings of the website. Experts might
link missing connection security to the risk of eavesdropping of credentials, with
the severity depending on the website type. They might also employ the website
trustworthiness rating and website type to deduce risks of forged products or
privacy issues. Either case may require an active intervention that blocks the user
without interacting with the warning or a passive intervention, only highlighting
a potential problem – for example, through a symbol in the browser chrome.
A major part of the additional e↵ort for software developers from contextu-
alized interventions lies in the formalization of the implicit knowledge of experts.
The goal of this work thus is to guide this process with a holistic methodology.
Implicit and unstructured expert knowledge is formalized to an abstract risk
model – a model that allows to derive risk levels for concrete contexts. The ab-
stract risk model thus enables developers to implement contextualized decisions
of whether to intervene. More specifically, the knowledge is transformed so that
it allows the assessment of risk for concrete situations based on indicators, such
as the connection security or the type of the website. The main contribution
is the methodology for this process. Its viability is shown in a case study on
Web-browser warnings.
2 Background on risk assessment
There is a wealth of publications available on risk management [2, 3]. First, there
are national and international standards on risk management. ISO 27005 [6] pro-
vides a general framework for risk management in IT systems. The U.S. FIPS-
65 standard, withdrawn in 1995, applied the well-known quantitative approach
“Annualized Loss Expectancy” (ALE, [8]). The most widely-used management
approaches are of qualitative nature, though. Among other problems, quantita-
tive estimations suggest a precision that is not realistic with the available input
[12, 9]. Many aspects, such as attacker motivation in case of insider threats, are
di cult to quantify. A well-known qualitative approach is the NIST Special Pub-
lication 800-30 [12] that supersedes the quantitative FIPS-65 standard. Similar
to other standard methods, NIST 800-30 starts with a qualitative valuation of
assets and impacts of incidents. Then, threats and vulnerabilities are identified
and categorized with qualitative likelihood estimations. In a risk assessment step,
the inputs are combined into risk estimations and, in the risk management part,
mitigations are chosen.
These risk management processes are powerful methods for the assessment
of risks. However, these are tailored for risk assessments of a concrete situation
– for example, how likely is an attack on the company network. Conversely,
our method aims to create abstract risk models that describe risks for changing
situations since we need to assess for each situation whether an intervention is
appropriate.
More focused on the application in warnings and interventions are approaches
that model the expert knowledge [5]. These emphasize how the risk needs to
be assessed and employ decision trees. We build upon these approaches in the
method laid out below.
3 Methodology to construct an abstract risk model
The goal in this paper is to propose a method to create an abstract risk model.
The model is abstract in the sense that it can be applied for the risk assessment
of concrete situations. A concrete situation is described through indicators, such
as whether a connection is secured. The main challenges are the collection and
formalization of expert knowledge. For these tasks, security practitioners and
domain experts gather as the risk assessment team and provide their risk esti-
mations. Specifically, the team meets for workshops to construct the abstract
risk model, or to adapt an existing one to the changing threat landscape. The
abstract risk assessment is based upon the concepts of qualitative risk analysis
as laid out in ISO 27005 [6] and NIST 800-30 [12].
As outlined in Figure 1, the risk assessment team completes five steps from
an early brainstorming to actually assigning abstract risk estimates. These are
structured by individual preparatory steps to limit the cognitive load and im-
prove the repeatability of the process. The result is an abstract model of the
risks in an application area based on expert knowledge.
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Fig. 1. Overview of the methodology to construct the abstract risk model
Also shown in Figure 1, the process initiator as step zero firstly defines the
application area and the scope of risks to cover – for example, limiting the anal-
ysis to risks in Web browsing. Secondly, this role recruits security practitioners
and domain experts as members of the risk assessment team. The result of the
abstract risk assessment, the abstract risk model, is then used by developers to
implement the algorithm for when and how to intervene.
In the following, we describe each of the steps in turn. For illustration, we
use a limited running example from Web browsing.
3.1 Structure knowledge of threats
As the first step, the risk assessment team needs to structure their explicit and
implicit knowledge on a high level to support the later steps of the method. At
this point, the emphasis lies on the relevant threats, that is, what potentially
could happen, and how the threats relate. Explicit knowledge primarily refers to
threats mentioned in documents, such as white papers, on security in the appli-
cation area. Members of the team collect these documents and extract threats
prior to the actual workshop on an individual basis. Implicit knowledge is the
additional knowledge from training and experience that experts can employ to
complete the picture (add missing threats) and connect the dots – relate the
threats.
In this process, the structuring of the knowledge of threats occurs as a mind-
mapping exercise. The goal is to lay out how actions of users potentially lead to
adversary actions and to consequences for the user. The resulting graph should
show how user actions and threats interrelate. Edges symbolize potential cau-
sations, that is, a next step in an attack or a consequence. We call the result
“threat dependency graph” (TDG). Figure 2 shows a limited example for Web
browsing to illustrate the concepts.
The risk assessment team can employ typical mind-mapping tools, beginning
with o✏ine media, such as whiteboards, and later digitalizing the resulting graph.
3.2 Identify key adverse incidents
The later risk assessment should be based on the actual impact for the end
user. Accordingly, the granularity for the results of the risk assessment needs to
corresponds with relevance of threats for end users. Specifically, in the example
in Figure 2, it might be di cult to assess the impact of a technical threat such
as “Eavesdropping” for the end user, while it is realistic to assess “Spam.”
Since both types of threats, directly relevant and rather technical, are present
in the TDG, the risk assessment team explicitly has to identify the relevant
threats in the TDG in this step. The main question to ask for each threat in the
TDG is, “Does the threat have a direct consequence to the end users?” That is,
for example, do they incur a financial loss or have a negative perception. We call
these “adverse incidents.” In the example in Figure 2, they are marked red.
3.3 Elicit paths from user actions to incidents
To assess risks, the assessment team often need to consider how an attack would
occur. To provide this information, the team in this step needs to elicit the
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Fig. 2. A limited example of a threat dependency graph for Web browsing – result of
the threat brainstorming; boxes with dark background represent user actions
relevant paths that connect user actions with incidents. These paths are already
present in the TDG through the edges between threats, but directly considering
all paths through the TDG will result in an unmanageable number for the risk
assessment. Thus, in this step, the team explicitly chooses the relevant paths
from the entirety in the TDG.
For the limited example, a detail from the result of this step is shown in
Figure 3. The paths are represented here as a tree with the root representing
a user action (here: “Send personal data”) and the leaves being the incidents.
Other incidents from the TDG, such as “Spam,” have been left out since these
appeared to be irrelevant in comparison to others, such as “Unauthorized pay-
ment.” Through this selection, a first risk assessment step is conducted, since
paths are excluded if they are redundant or obviously irrelevant. The process of
selecting paths is technically supported from the TDG data.
As an alternative visualization, the roots can also represent the incidents and
leaves user actions, then resembling attack trees [11].
3.4 Group paths into scenarios
Typically the previous step results in multiple relevant paths from user actions
to incidents. An example can be found in Figure 3 in the case of “Unauthorized
transfer”, which can be a result of a phishing website or of eavesdropping on an
unprotected connection. These paths will have very di↵erent risk assessments –
in the above example, the trustworthiness of a website will be di↵erently gauged
than the connection security. To di↵erentiate these risks in the assessment, the
risk assessment team groups these paths as scenarios in this step. In the above
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Fig. 3. Detail of a tree with paths from user actions to adverse incidents
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Fig. 4. Scenarios (thick border) added to paths from user action to incidents
example, this could result, as shown in Figure 4, in “Send login credentials unpro-
tected” for one path, and in “Send login credentials to untrustworthy website”
for another. Note, that each scenario typically encompasses multiple incidents,
but only one relevant path to each incident.
3.5 Conduct abstract risk assessment
The previous steps have resulted in adverse incidents to be assessed, paths lead-
ing from user actions to the incidents, and groupings of user actions and paths
to incidents as scenarios. Given these artifacts, the risk assessment team can
abstractly assess the incidents’ risks. The risk assessment should result in an ab-
stract risk model that may then be applied for a concrete situation – for example,
an actual security status of the connection.
The team conducts the risk assessment per scenario. Within a scenario, all
relevant incidents are considered – that is, all incidents that are endpoints in the
paths from user actions in the scenario. For each incident, two decision trees are
constructed, one for the probability of an incident and one for the severity of
the incident. These are split to follow the independent assessment of probability
and severity in qualitative risk assessment (cf. e.g. NIST 800-30 [12]). A detail
of an example decision tree for the probability of “Unauthorized transfer” in the
scenario “Send login credentials unprotected” is given in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Detail of a decision tree for the probability of the adverse incident “Unautho-
rized transfer,” scenario “Send login credentials unprotected,” nodes are indicators
The nodes of the decision trees represent indicators that describe the concrete
situation – for example, the connection security. Edges from an indicator repre-
sent the di↵erent options for the indicator, e.g. EV-SSL, SSL, no protection for
connection security. The risk assessment team identifies appropriate indicators
from their security and domain knowledge. Leaves of the decision tree are the
outcomes, either probabilities or severities. Since users may perceive di↵erent
types of risks di↵erently [14], severities are qualified by their type – for example,
“financial” or “social” risk. The risk assessment team defines these categories as
appropriate for the domain, but may start from findings on risk perception (e.g.
from [14]).
Interventions are only appropriate, if users are likely to eventually take the
action that leads to an incident. For example, if no password field is on a webpage,
we can exclude the immediate danger of login credentials being transmitted.
Therefore, each scenario also includes a decision tree for the probability of the
respective action.
4 Applying the abstract risk model in practice
Once the risk assessment team has constructed the abstract risk model for an
application, developers can implement it for the decision of whether and how
to intervene. Specifically, the abstract risk model is used to assess the risk of a
concrete situation.
In practice, the developer implements the risk assessment to run each time the
situation changes – for example, when a new website is loaded or the connection
security switches to HTTPS. In the proposed method, the change in situation
can be seen as a change in one of the relevant indicators of the risk model.
Thus, the appropriateness of an intervention is rechecked for new information
becoming available and further actions that a user takes. For example, as part
of the mobile application installation procedure, the assessment is run several
times:
1. When an application is selected (indicator “application selected”: “yes”),
2. On display of the installation page (“installation button visible”: “yes”),
3. On clicking the installation button (“installation button clicked”: “yes”).
This allows the system to decide each time, whether an intervention is nec-
essary and which is appropriate.
The basic process of risk assessment is shown in Figure 6: The change of
an indicator (the situation) leads to an evaluation of all scenarios for the risk
levels of their respective incidents. The lists of incidents from all scenarios is then
ranked by risk level. Lastly, the maximum of the incidents’ risk levels is applied
to decide on the appropriateness of available interventions. The list of incidents,
ordered by risk level, can also be used for the communication of selected concrete
risks to the end user.
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Fig. 6. Process of applying the abstract risk model
To deduce the risk levels for each of the incidents within a scenario, four
steps are taken:
1. The decision trees for the incident probabilities are evaluated per incident.
2. The decision trees for the incident severities are evaluated per incident.
3. The decision tree for the action probability of the end user is evaluated for
the scenario.
4. The outcomes from the decision trees are combined by transforming the
qualitative values into numerical values and multiplication of the numerical
values:
RiskIncident(Situation) = ProbabilityIncident(Situation) ⇤
SeverityIncident(Situation) ⇤
ProbabilityAction(Situation)
For the decision on the appropriate intervention, thresholds for risk levels of
individual incidents are defined. Thus, the type of intervention – for example,
whether passive information or an active warning – is deduced from the maxi-
mum risk level of the incidents. The risk levels of the incidents are not further
aggregated because they are derived from qualitative data.
5 Case study: Web browser warnings
To evaluate the viability of the proposed approach, we applied the method in a
case study for Web-browser warnings. Web browsing is an interesting case with
its broad range of threats – from eavesdropping to phishing and malicious soft-
ware downloads – and its broad range of use cases – including online shopping
and banking. Users can also interact with Web sites in several ways, beginning
with the visiting of a website, but also encompassing the sending of login cre-
dentials and personal data, and downloading documents and software. Making
sense of this breadth of actions and threats is a good case for evaluating the
method for practical viability.
5.1 Constructing the abstract risk model
The first part of the methodology is constructing the abstract risk model. The
scope of risks was defined as those relevant to the end user while browsing the
Web. The risk assessment team at this point consisted of researchers, the authors
of this paper, another security and a legal researcher. We applied the steps as
described in Section 3. Key numbers from the process are shown in Table 1.
The brainstorming phase (step 1) included combing through scientific and white
Table 1. Count of items in the Web-browsing case study
Item No. Examples
Actions 4 Visit website; Submit personal data
Scenarios 9 Send login credentials unprotected; Visit untrustworthy website
Incidents 17 Unauthorized payment; Spam
Threats in TDG 74 Eavesdropping in transport; Collect behavioral data
Threat relations 111 Payment credentials theft ! Unauthorized payment
papers on Web risks. The risk assessment team grouped the identified threats
and related them with each other for the TDG. Also, key adverse incidents could
be identified (step 2). A detail from the resulting TDG is shown in Figure 7.
Fig. 7. Detail of the threat dependency graph in the case study; dark gray background
represents a user actions
The team elicited paths from user actions to incidents (step 3) in a prototype
tool developed for the purpose. As part of this exercise, they added additional
threats to the TDG, including data loss for user data on websites. Similarly, the
team found that they needed to add relations between threats – for example,
the missing link between “Manipulation of website content” and “Submitting
personal data” to an untrustworthy website. One important observation was
that some experts would prefer to build these trees from the incidents, not from
the user actions as originally suggested. For step 4, the team could identify
relevant scenarios as groupings of the paths (step 4).
The team also conducted the actual abstract risk assessment in the purpose-
built tool by constructing the decision trees per incident for the scenarios. They
found that they needed the list of paths between user action and the incident
to elicit the relevant indicators. We accordingly implemented an extra output
of these paths in the tool. Also, indicators were introduced which might prove
di cult to implement in software – for example, whether the current user is
reusing login credentials between websites. The team also identified redundancies
between the decision trees for di↵erent incidents – for example, with regard to
whether the user is expected to log in on the website later on. We introduced
the new concept of Abstract indicators to capture the notion that some parts of
decision trees can be “factored out”. For example, the abstract indicator “Will
login” takes indicators, such as the website type, into account. It could then
be applied as any other indicator in the decision trees. These additions will be
evaluated as future work.
5.2 Applying the abstract risk model
The output from applying the abstract risk model to a concrete situation are
shown in the Case Explorer, where the input of indicators can be simulated.
The result, of which a detail is shown in Figure 8, is a list of incidents for the
scenarios with risk levels.
Fig. 8. Detail of the Case Explorer showing incidents with their risk level for an un-
protected online banking website
Figure 8 shows the case that a website has no SSL protection and is catego-
rized as “online banking.” Accordingly, the abstract risk model results in a high
risk (85.5) for the incident “Unauthorized transfer.” This would justify an active
warning, blocking the access to the online-banking site. However, for a di↵erent
case, not in the screenshot, of an online-shopping site without SSL protection,
the risk of “unauthorized payment” is assessed to be moderate (47.5), thus rather
suggesting a passive warning in the browser chrome. Once a password field is
focused, “unauthorized payment” is evaluated as high risk, justifying an active
intervention. In the current implementations of Web browsers, missing SSL pro-
tection would not have resulted in an active warning at all, only a passive signal
in the browser chrome – for example, a missing lock icon.
6 Discussion
This paper proposes a methodology for constructing and applying abstract risk
models. We demonstrate how these models capture expert knowledge and inform
the decision whether and how to intervene. While applying the method in a
case study on Web browsing, we saw that it is realistic to formalize the expert
knowledge and that it can be advantageous to apply the abstract risk model in
practice. Warnings can be more precise and thus less of a hindrance and more of
a help. While our evaluation only considered a fraction of relevant cases where a
more nuanced decision is helpful, we will explore its practical advantages further
in an implementation of warnings in Web browsers as a browser extension.
We also noted a number of potentials for future improvement of the method
from the experience that we will take into account in the next iteration of the
method. It is also necessary to consider the completeness of the expert knowledge
in the abstract risk model and its adaption to changing risks over time. Both
aspects can be addressed through the iterative nature of the method: Process
steps are expected to be repeated over time if threats are missing or the risks
change. Another important observation was that some of the indicators employed
by the risk assessment team might not be readily available at a su ciently high
precision, such as the type of a website. We will explore this aspect in future work.
A further open issue is the question of accountability for risk-based interventions
in comparison to today’s rather technical interventions: Will the developer or the
risk assessment team be held accountable when a warning is not shown?
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